In order to map philosophical, moral and cultural views of animal suffering, it is first important to have a look at the actuality of that suffering. Do non-human animals feel pain and suffering? How do Western societies take this pain and suffering into account?
Do other animals feel pain?
'Pain' is usually described as a notably unpleasant physical sensation. It is often distinguished from the rudimentary capacity to map out noxious stimuli, that is, nociception . In nociception, pain receptors detect harmful chemical, physical, thermal and other changes in the body, and send out a signal to the brain, which again will lead to various 'instinctual' responses (such as pulling one's hand away from fire). 1 Pain, on the other hand, refers to nociception that is subjectively felt or experienced: it is the feeling of and not mere response to something unpleasant and obnoxious that is relevant.
2 Therefore, pain is commonly viewed as including two elements: sensory and affective. The sensory element concerns the severity and location of bodily harm, whereas the affective element determines the level of the harm's obnoxiousness, that is, how much it matters to the subject. The latter refers to the experienced 'feel' of pain and is the element that really gives pain its unique nature. We do not merely respond to harmful stimuli (as, for instance, plants do), but feel something towards those stimuli. This means that pain has an experiential, affective sidein other words, it has 'negative valence' (NRC 2009). It is linked to what in philosophy of mind is called 'phenomenal consciousness', which again is defined as the feeling of 'what it is like' to be a human being, a chicken, or a bat (see Nagel 1974), and which concerns 'qualia'; the subjective experience or feel of existence. It is this experience or feel that pain is intertwined with: pain is experience doubled together with nociception. That is, a pig in pain does not merely undergo harm, but also feels something towards that harm.
It would seem pretty obvious that (at least many) animals can experience pain. However, Western cultures have seen some very eager efforts to argue the exact opposite. Most of them utilize self-consciousness and propositional language as factors that exclude animals from the sphere of experience. That is, non-human animals' capacity to form the type of experiences necessary for pain has been placed under doubt, due to its presumed links to highly complex cognitive capacities. Selfconsciousness means -quite literally -consciousness of oneself. More broadly, it refers to the ability to have a 'theory of mind', which enables one to conceptualize oneself and others as experiencing creatures. This ability, again, has traditionally been linked to the use of propositional, sentence-based language. The argument has been that I cannot experience pain unless I am capable of self-consciousness and its counterpart, propositional language. That is, unless I can comprehend the concepts 'myself' and 'pain', and form the sentence 'I am in pain', pain is not experienced.
This has had a significant impact on how animal pain is viewed. A famous critic of non-human experience, Peter Carruthers, has argued that other animals do not have self-consciousness (or the required theory of mind), and that this lack renders them incapable of experience. Carruthers advocates a higher-order thought approach to consciousness, and maintains that one must be able to form beliefs concerning one's experiences before those experiences become conscious. Language and concepts constitute a necessary component of such beliefs, and, thus, where there is neither language nor concepts, there is no conscious experience (Carruthers 1998; 2000 -for an earlier approach, see Carruthers 1992 . Peter Harrison has been another vocal critic of the idea that nonhuman animals can experience pain. Amongst other things, he argues that the capacity to use reason in relation to pain is important, and here again concepts play a role. Partly based on this, Harrison boldly suggests that animals are not sentient creatures (Harrison 1991) . Similarly, Donald Davidson has criticized the notion of 'animal minds' on the basis of propositional language: since animals cannot have the concept of a 'belief', they cannot have beliefs, which again places the existence of their minds in doubt (Davidson 1985) . Thus, the sceptical view is that, in the absence of self-consciousness and concepts such as 'pain', animals cannot experience pain.
